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Abstract
To mitigate potential contagion from future banking crises, the European Com-
mission recently proposed a framework which would provide for the bail-in of bank
creditors in the event of failure. In this study, we examine this framework retro-
spectively in the context of failed European banks during the global financial crisis.
Empirical findings suggest that equity and subordinated bond holders would have
been the main losers from the e535 billion impairment losses realized by failed
European banks. Losses attributed to senior debt holders would, on aggregate,
have been proportionally small, while no losses would have been imposed on de-
positors. Cross-country analysis, incorporating stress-tests, reveals a divergence
of outcomes with subordinated debt holders wiped out in a number of countries,
while senior debt holders of Greek, Austrian and Irish banks would have required
bail-in.
Keywords: Bank Resolution, Bail-In, European Bank Failure, Global Financial
Crisis, Impairment Charges.
∗Corresponding Author, Tel: +353-1-716 8909.
Email addresses: conlon.thomas@ucd.ie (Thomas Conlon), john.cotter@ucd.ie (John
Cotter)
The authors would like to acknowledge the financial support of Science Foundation Ire-
land under Grant Number 08/SRC/FM1389. We are grateful for helpful comments and assis-
tance from two anonymous referees, the Editor (Iftekhar Hasan), Gregory Connor, Ajay Chopra,
March 21, 2018
1. Introduction
The credit crunch or global financial crisis, which begun in 2007, is the most
severe since the great depression and has been characterised by the large num-
ber of distressed and failed systemically important financial institutions (Acharya,
2013; Veronesi and Zingales, 2010; Brunnermeier, 2009). The crisis has highlighted
the ongoing need for a robust and consistent mechanism to allow for the resolu-
tion of failed banks (Laeven and Valencia, 2010). In particular, the European
response to the large number of distressed banks has been fragmented and capri-
cious (Schich and Kim, 2012). Individual European Union member states took
a uncoordinated approach to the crisis, re-capitalizing and nationalizing a range
of domestic financial institutions (Du¨bel, 2013). Ultimately, this approach may
have contributed to financial contagion as investors had little clarity regarding
the resolution mechanism to be adopted across nations, potentially resulting in a
‘flight-to-safety’ (De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Longstaff, 2010; Mizen, 2008).
In order to mitigate potential contagion from a distressed banking sector, in
2012 the European Commission proposed a Framework for Bank Recovery and
Resolution (BRR) (The European Commission, 2012a).1,2 This was recently sup-
plemented by the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), through which the ECB
will apply the proposals on bank resolution, (The European Commission, 2013).
Within these frameworks, failed banks will be recapitalized either through the
mandatory write-down of liabilities or, alternatively, the conversion of liabilities to
Zhenyu Wang and participants at the FMC2 Bank Resolution Conference (Dublin, Ireland, June
2013).
1The BBR will be implemented from 1st January 2015, with bail-in elements to follow from
1st January 2016
2Similar frameworks have been outlined in both the United States
and Great Britain, with bail-in of creditors a common feature
(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Bank of England, 2012).
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equity (a bail-in of creditors or debt write-down). It is anticipated that this mech-
anism will allow distressed financial institutions to continue as a going concern,
while shareholders will be diluted or wiped out. Moreover, the bail-in mechanism
would help sever the link between systemically important financial institutions and
the sovereign.
As outlined in the BRR, a bail-in would apply to all liabilities not backed by
assets or collateral, but not to deposits protected by a deposit guarantee scheme3,
short-term (inter-bank) lending or client assets. The ordinary allocation of losses
and ranking process in the event of insolvency would be followed. Under the frame-
work, equity holders would absorb initial losses in their entirety before any debt
claim is subject to write-down. Next, subordinated debt holders would equally
share any further losses, followed by senior debt holders. Finally, depositors not
protected by a deposit guarantee scheme would absorb losses. A limited number of
exempt liability holders have been proposed, including secured liabilities, trade li-
abilities, covered deposits, certain derivatives and short term debt with a maturity
of under one month.
It is important to note that the design of a bail-in differs from contingent capital
liabilities such as CoCos which provide for contingent conversion to equity in the
case of bank failure (Koziol and Lawrenz, 2012)4. These securities are structured
and purchased by investors on the basis of possible conversion from debt to equity,
3While one of the objectives of the resolution and recovery framework is to project depositors,
deposit funding of up to e100, 000 would in practise be recouped using a deposit guarantee
scheme. In effect, this results in bail-in for all failed bank depositors, with smaller depositors
benefiting from a sovereign guarantee.
4Also related is the issuance of subordinated debt by banks. While subordinated debt
should be priced to reflect the risk of bank failure, there are mixed views on whether subor-
dinated debt results in market enforced discipline among financial institutions (Sironi, 2003;
Flannery and Sorescu, 1996).
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with maximum losses equivalent to the notional security face value. A bail-in
would result in mandatory conversion with the total write-down level determined
by the level of banking losses. However similarities exist, with a conversion trigger
required in both cases. In the case of instruments such as CoCos, conversion
criteria have tended to be contingent upon bank capital levels deteriorating below
a certain level (McDonald, 2013; Glasserman and Nouri, 2012). In contrast, a
bail-in is a statutory power allowing authorities to write-down bank liabilities,
with specifics regarding the trigger largely undefined at this point.
Future funding costs of financial institutions will likely depend upon the level
of anticipated write-downs that might be imposed on creditors. However, little is
known regarding the impact of a bail-in on the different liability holders. In this
paper, we retrospectively study the proportion of liabilities that authorities would
have needed to bail-in to cover losses associated with the global financial crisis. In
particular, we measure the magnitude of actual impairment charges experienced
by banks after 2007 and apply these to banks that required bail-out. Finally, we
perform stress test analysis to help understand the impact of considerably larger
losses on creditors in the event of bail-in.
This paper contributes to the debate on the form that future resolution mech-
anisms will take. The results suggest that the aggregate impairment charges of
e534 billion experienced by failed European banks would predominantly have im-
pacted equity and subordinated liabilities under the proposed bail-in framework.
Cross-country analysis suggests that senior debt holders would only have incurred
losses in Austria, Greece and Ireland, while depositors would not have been bailed-
in within any of the states examined. Moreover, even under stressed conditions
with losses up to 20% of total assets, depositors would not have required bail-in.
The findings suggest that a bail-in mechanism that largely impacts subordinated
investors would help to reduce the danger of flight-to-safety, in particular limit-
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ing the impact of bank-runs by depositors. Further, the bail-in framework should
result in the returns associated with bank debt securities being linked to their
explicit risk, perhaps reducing the excessive leverage associated with banks that
underperformed during the crisis (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Finally, a bail-in
mechanism would help to formally cut the links between the sovereign and finan-
cial institutions deemed ‘too big to fail’, by removing the requirement for sovereign
bail-out of failed financial institutions.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an outline of the Euro-
pean proposals related to resolution and bail-in of financial institutions. Section
3 introduces the data related to failed and surviving European banks, while re-
sults from retrospectively applying the bail-in framework to European banks are
described in section 4. The bail-in mechanism is discussed and some concluding
remarks given in section 5.
2. European Proposals on Bank Resolution and Recovery
In order to ensure long term financial stability and reduce the potential cost of
future bank failures, the European Commission recently introduced the Framework
on Bank Resolution and Recovery (The European Commission, 2012a) and agreed
a Single Resolution Mechanism (The European Commission, 2013).5 The resolu-
tion of a financial institution is defined as the restructuring of the institution in
order to ensure the continuity of its essential functions, preserve financial stability
and restore the viability of all or part of that institution (The European Commission,
5This section provides an outline of the BRR and SRM, with particular focus on the bail-
in component of each. Considerable further detail on the resolution mechanism proposed may
be found in The European Commission (2012a) and The European Commission (2013). Note:
While the legislation underlying the SRM has yet to be ratified by the European parliament, any
changes made should not greatly alter the main findings in this paper.
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2012a). Under the framework definition, a bank would become subject to resolu-
tion when
• it has reached a point of distress such that there are no realistic prospects of
recovery over an appropriate timeframe,
• all other intervention measures have been exhausted, and
• winding up the institution under normal insolvency proceedings would risk
prolonged uncertainty or financial instability.
The framework further prescribes a range of resolution tools to be implemented
dependent on the circumstances surrounding the difficulties experienced by the
particular financial institution, including private sector acquisitions, ‘good’ and
‘bad’ banks to hold performing and toxic assets, a bridge bank to hold the assets
and liabilities of failed institutions, and finally a bail-in of creditors.
In July 2013, the European Commission subsequently proposed the single reso-
lution mechanism (SRM) as part of the commitment to a single European banking
union (the single supervisory mechanism6).7 The SRM will apply the single rule-
book on bank resolution proposed in the European framework on bank resolution
and recovery, (The European Commission, 2013). The SRM sets out in detail the
order of priority in case of write downs or conversion to equity and the assess-
ment of the amount by which liabilities need to be converted. The decision on
when to recommend the resolution of a bank to the European Commission lies
6The single supervisory mechanism will transfer all responsibilities for the prudential super-
vision and authorisation of financial institutions to the European Central Bank.
7The European parliament and council backed the SRM on 20th March 2014, with formal
ratification due to take place in April 2014. The SRM is scheduled to enter into force on 1
January 2015, whereas bail-in and resolution functions would apply from 1 January 2016, as
specified under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.
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with a resolution board, made up of executive and deputy directors, representa-
tives appointed by the Commission and ECB, together with members appointed
by individual European member states. The SRM will be able to draw on a resolu-
tion fund, funded by contributions from the banking sector and replacing national
resolution funds, in the exceptional event that additional resources are required.
Banks will be required to hold minimum required eligible liabilities, determined
based on an institutions size, risk and business model, to mitigate the possibility
of depositor bail-in.
Details on the procedure for placing a bank into resolution under the SRM
are presently being finalised. The most recent draft regulation8 states that the
procedure begins with an assessment by the ECB that (i) a bank is failing or likely
to fail (Article 16.2a), and (ii) there is no reasonable prospect that any supervisory
or private action would prevent its failure within a reasonable time-frame (Article
16.2b). Should an institution be found to be in violation of this assessment, the
finding is communicated to the European Commission and the single resolution
board (Article 16.1). Conditions under which a bank may be pronounced as failing
or likely to fail are listed in Article 16.3: where the bank is in breach of requirements
for authorisation (insufficient capital); its net worth is negative; it is or will soon
be unable to repay its debts; or there is a need for extraordinary public support.9
The regulation then requires that these facts are verified by the single resolution
board and reported to the European Commission. The Commission will then make
the final decision on whether to adopt the resolution recommendations.
8Our synopsis is based on the presidency compromise text issued on November 4th 2013,
document 15503/13.
9While the conditions stated define the general circumstances for bank failure, they do not
prescribe specific triggers to instigate a resolution process. These might include quantitative
measures such as equity capital or liquidity deteriorating below a pre-determined level.
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The single resolution board will draw up a resolution scheme, one component
of which may require the use of bail-in. The resolution scheme will determine the
amount by which eligible liabilities will be reduced or converted to equity. The
pecking order for bail-in adopted in the BRR is followed in the SRM regulation
(Article 15): Common Tier 1 Equity, Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, subordi-
nated debt, unsecured debt, unsecured claims and finally uncovered deposits, and
the deposit guarantee scheme in lieu of guaranteed depositors which are excluded.
3. Data and Bank Failures
In order to retrospectively assess the impact of bank resolution through bail-in
on European banks, we first identified which banks suffered distress during the
crisis and the resulting bail-out mechanism applied. Without an explicit definition
of the trigger for bail-in, the timing of an actual sovereign bail-out is a reasonable
proxy for our retrospective analysis. However, it is worth noting that as further
details on the bail-in framework are worked out, a more considered bail-in trigger
may emerge.
In this study, banks are divided into three groupings: Nationalized banks,
which were fully nationalized by the state, re-capitalized banks, which received
either preferred or ordinary share capital from government sources and surviv-
ing banks, which required no state support in the form of capital injection.10
Information relating to the bail-out status of different financial institutions was
obtained from a variety of sources, (Molyneux et al., 2011; Altunbas et al., 2011;
Laeven and Valencia, 2010; Petrovic and Tutsch, 2009; Goddard et al., 2009). In
10Surviving banks may have received support in other ways such as covered bond issuance,
where the sovereign guaranteed bond issuance. Given the prevalence of this mechanism in Europe
throughout the crisis, these institutions have not been considered as failed for the purposes of
this study.
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total 15 European banks were identified as nationalized, 66 as re-capitalized by the
sovereign and 691 required no sovereign support. The cross-country breakdown is
given in table 1. The majority of nationalized banks were in Ireland and Great
Britain, while re-capitalization occurred across a wide range of countries.
Fundamental accounting related data for European banks was obtained from
Bankscope. The data has been standardized, corresponds to IFRS accounting
regulations and all data has been converted into a common Euro currency at the
appropriate time synchronized exchange rate. A range of filters are used to ensure
no double counting of banks due to subsidiaries. Where possible, the bank holding
company was studied to avoid double counting. Consolidated bank accounting
data was used throughout. Balance sheet information for individual banks was
sourced from Bankscope and aggregated at country, failure status and overall
European level in the following analysis.
4. Empirical Results
To retrospectively estimate the impact of bail-in on European bank investors
during the global financial crisis, we first take the distribution of failed versus
surviving banks in table 1 and calculate their subsequent impairment charges.
Total realized impairment charges for each classification (eg. re-capitalized) were
identified by summing loan write-downs, non-recurring expenses (once-off expenses
inclusive of losses on credit derivatives such as CDOs) and security impairments
from 2008 to 2012. While further related losses may be realized in the future, this
is likely the best estimate of impairment charges currently available. Note that this
measure does not contain additional losses that may be realized by special purpose
vehicles set up by sovereign states to hold impaired bank assets. However, as a
robustness check against underestimation of impairments, we further stress-test
the bail-in mechanism for considerably greater losses than those realized during
9
the credit crunch.
Total realized European bank impairment charges between 2008 and 2012 are
estimated as e940 billion. Of this total, 43.1% can be attributed to the 691 sur-
viving banks. The remaining 56.9% or e535 billion is associated with the 81
banks that were nationalized or required re-capitalization. Considering individual
countries, the largest total impairments for failed banks were experienced in Great
Britain, followed by Germany and Ireland. In terms of banks that survived with-
out government assistance, Spanish, British and Italian banks accounted for the
majority of losses.
[Table 1 about here.]
As the bail-in mechanism would apply to all unsecured bank liabilities, it is
important to gain insight into the funding sources utilized by European banks in
the lead up to the global financial crisis. Table 2 details the aggregate funding
proportions for the European banks studied at year-end 2006 and 2007.11 As
funding choices in 2007 may have been impacted by the global financial crisis, we
focus on 2006 funding here. Considering all banks, customer deposits accounted
for 35.2% of funding, bank deposits 15.7% and equity 4.5%. Long term bank debt
accounted for 18.9% of total funding, the majority of which was senior bank debt.
Finally, other liabilities, inclusive of derivatives, non-interest liabilities, repos and
trading liabilities accounted for 25.5% of liabilities in 2006.
[Table 2 about here.]
Contrasting failed versus surviving banks, some differential characteristics are
evident. The level of equity funding used by nationalized banks (2.9%) and re-
11While differences in funding between 2006 and 2007 can be observed, little quantitative
difference exists between 2006 and previous years. Results not shown for brevity, but are available
from the authors.
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capitalized banks (4.2%) was noticeably lower than that found for surviving banks
(5.0%). Since regulatory capital is determined relative to risk weighted assets, this
suggests that failed banks reported assets with lower risk levels than surviving
banks.12 Considering the mix of depository and long-term funding, banks that
were subsequently nationalized are shown to have largely depended on long-term
debt funding, in contrast to other banks. In particular, the proportion of long-term
debt for nationalized banks was 40.8%, compared to a base case of 18.9%. Given
this higher dependence on long-term funding, these banks were potentially more
susceptible to liquidity problems. However, in the context of the bail-in mechanism
proposed by the European Commission, the higher levels of debt funding imply a
lower risk of depositor bail-in with losses experienced first by debt holders.
Having gained some insight into the level of bank losses associated with the
crisis and the funding structure adopted by European banks, we now retrospec-
tively examine the impact of the proposed European bail-in mechanism on bank
creditors, given in table 3. To this end, we apply the BRR to the 81 European
banks deemed as having failed. We measure the proportion of total bank liabilities
that would have been bailed-in to cover realized bank losses. In addition, we break
out the allocation of bail-in losses among the different capital providers in order of
seniority. In each case, realized impairment charges from 2008−2012 are measured
as a proportion of aggregate 2006 bank liabilities.13
Considering first the aggregate bail-in impact on failed European banks, we
12This observation is based on the fact that all failed European banks met the minimum
regulatory risk weighted tier 1 capital ratio in 2006.
13As noted above, balance sheets of certain banks may reflect credit crunch losses by 2007.
For instance, Northern Rock received liquidity support from the Bank of England in September
2007. However, our results are qualitatively similar using 2007 balance sheets and are available
upon request.
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note differing consequences for the various creditors in table 3. For recapitalized
banks, only equity holders would have been bailed-in to cover losses. In contrast
nationalized banks would, on aggregate, have required bail-in of all equity and
subordinated debt holders, and 6.9% of senior debt holders to cover realized im-
pairments. These results suggest that the extreme losses sustained by banks during
the global financial crisis would have predominantly resulted in losses for equity
and subordinated debt holders in European banks.14 However, the picture is not
quite so straightforward when individual nations are considered.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 also retrospectively considers the impact of a bail-in on banking in-
vestors across the range of European countries considered. While equity holders
would have been the predominate losers in the majority of countries, subordinated
debt holders would also have encountered losses in Austria (100% for nationalized
banks), Germany (100% for both recapitalized and nationalized banks), Great
Britain (75.5% for recapitalized banks), Greece (100%), Ireland (100%) and Por-
tugal (50%). Senior debt holders would have encountered small losses in Germany
and Austria, while large write-downs would have been required in Greece (77.8%)
and Ireland (24.6% for nationalized banks, 64.5% for recapitalized). On aggre-
gate, the largest losses would have been felt by investors in Irish and Greek banks,
accounting for up to 23.3% of total balance sheet liabilities.
The analysis so far suggests that a bail-in of creditors would not have resulted
in outright decimation for bank investors. A stress-test analysis is now performed
to understand the impact of further losses, due either to underestimation of re-
14Du¨bel (2013) also finds that senior debt holders would have required bail-in in isolated cases,
for a study of a small number of European banks. Moreover, evidence is given that the level of
bail-in was closely related to the delay involved in resolving an institution.
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alized losses resulting from the credit crunch or the possibility of a more severe
financial crisis. Table 4 details the aggregate impact on various investors of the
actual realized losses calculated for European banks, in addition to larger losses
amounting to 10% and 20% of total assets. In both stress-test cases, equity and
subordinated debt investors would have experienced full write-down for both na-
tionalized and recapitalized institutions. The outcome for senior debt write-downs
varies for nationalized and re-capitalized institutions. As shown earlier, national-
ized banks tended to be heavily reliant on long term debt, in particular senior debt.
This preponderance of senior debt would result in proportionally lower required
write-downs. In contrast, re-capitalized banks had greater dependence on deposits
resulting in large proportional write-downs for senior debt holders. However, even
with 20% losses, amounting to 500%15 of the actual realized losses from the global
financial crisis, depositors would not have been bailed-in.
[Table 4 about here.]
One major difficulty in developing an efficient bail-in mechanism is the danger
of contagion from bail-in of a single institution, due to other financial institutions
holding outstanding debt of the failed institution.16 Zhou et al. (2012) suggest
that an incorrectly structured bail-in mechanism may have the impact of shift-
ing risk to other parts of the financial sector. 17% of Euro area bank debt was
purchased by other financial institutions in 2010, while insurance companies hold
between 20% and 30% of their investment portfolios in bank debt17, (Zhou et al.,
2012). Our stress-test findings for nationalized and recapitalized European banks
15This is calculated as the level of stress test losses over the actual losses for recapitalized
banks, 20%/4.0% = 500%.
16We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this obstacle.
17While the impact of contagion from a bail-in on insurance companies would be significant,
measuring the magnitude of this impact is outside the scope of this paper.
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suggest that in the case of 20% losses, consistent with the proportion of bank debt
held by other banks, depositors would not have required bail-in on aggregate. As
these losses would not just be limited to failed or recapitalized banks, we further
stress-test surviving banks to a level of 20% losses. In this extreme scenario, with
all banks requiring writedowns to a level of 20% of total assets, equity and subor-
dinated debt holders would have been fully written down, while 77% of senior debt
would have been bailed-in. Even in this case of widespread losses across European
banks, perhaps a consequence of contagion, depositors would not on aggregate
have required bail-in across failed or surviving banks.
These stress test results are suggestive of a large potential impact on bank
funding costs, given the reality of heavy losses for debt and equity investors in
the face of severe future banking crises. Moreover, they support the idea of the
larger capital base in the Basel III proposals and the introduction of hybrid and
contingent capital as an additional buffer against asset risks.
5. Conclusions and Discussion
The vast repercussions for sovereign balance sheets from the global financial
crisis has led authorities to seek ways to remove the implicit link between the
financial system and the sovereign. As part of a wider framework on bank resolu-
tion, the European Commission have proposed bail-in of banking investors in the
context of future banking crises. By imposing losses on the creditors of financial
institutions, the impact on public finances from banking distress should be sub-
stantially reduced. Moreover, the explicit statement of intent regarding creditor
write-downs should have a positive impact on the debt issuance of sovereign states
in the short term, important in the context of peripheral European states.
The findings outlined in this paper suggest large realized European banking
impairments associated with the global financial crisis. Existence of a bail-in
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mechanism would have predominantly impacted equity and subordinated debt
investors in European banks. Senior debtors would have experienced write-downs
in a limited number of nations, including Greece, Austria, Germany and Ireland.
Stress-test analysis demonstrates that impairments of up to 20% of total assets
would have resulted in losses of up to 96% for senior debt investors. Even in this
extreme scenario depositors would not have experienced write-downs, limiting the
danger of a ‘flight-to-safety’ and associated contagion due to bail-in.
The results detailed, in particular those outlining stress-test analysis, suggest
that aggregate bank borrowing costs for financial institutions would likely rise in
the face of potentially large bail-in write-downs. In keeping with previous findings
linking bank risk and subordinated debt yields, (Sironi, 2003; Flannery and Sorescu,
1996), investors are likely to weigh up the likelihood of an investment in a financial
institution being subject to mandatory write-down and expect a return commen-
surate with these risks. Given the link between bank performance and leverage
throughout the global financial crisis, (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012), this would have
the effect of forcing banks to have less leveraged balance sheets, more appropriate
to the riskiness of their asset portfolios.18
The current draft SRM regulation requires banks to hold a minimum level of
‘bail-inable’ assets. This may necessitate an alteration in individual bank capi-
tal structures in order to meet these requirements. Zhou et al. (2012) raises the
concern that banks may decide to shift their borrowings towards short-term and
secured financing under the bail-in proposal. A shift in bank borrowing towards
18Bank management have noted that increased levels of equity capital would have an adverse
effect on the ability of banks to lend, a theory that has been strongly criticized, (Admati et al.,
2010). Further, under certain circumstances high leverage may actually have a positive effect
on banks via socially useful liquidity creation to financially constrained firms and households
(DeAngelo and Stulz, 2013).
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short-term, bail-in exempt securities could be counter-productive, actually adding
to the dangers of financial contagion. However, the proposal to ensure banks hold
a minimum quantity of ‘bail-inable’ securities should mitigate this concern.
A variety of potential shortfalls surrounding the proposed European bail-in
mechanism have been highlighted. For a large systemically important financial
institution which is globally active, domestic European bail-in laws would not
necessarily be recognised in other jurisdictions, which might result in ambiguity
as to which assets could be bailed-in, (Gleeson, 2012). In addition, countries
which are early adopters of a bail-in mechanism might disadvantage their financial
institutions in terms of higher costs of funding, (Schich and Kim, 2012). Moreover,
the resolution process as currently proposed is a cumbersome process requiring
approval from a variety of parties, potentially slowing the process and creating
uncertainty surrounding an institution. The exact treatment under bail-in of other
liabilities such as repos, derivatives and trading liabilities (which account for a
large proportion of balance sheet liabilities, table 2) is currently unclear, adding
potential ambiguity to the bail-in process.
Another major concern with the proposed resolution process and the associated
bail-in mechanism is the ambiguity regarding the trigger resulting in resolution.19
While the SRM details general conditions under which banks would be deemed to
have failed, an explicit indicator regarding what constitutes a bank failure would
benefit both regulators and bank investors. Indeed without explicit quantitative
clarity on the trigger for creditor write-downs, investors may require a risk premium
in compensation. Linking the trigger to the leverage ratio or tier one capital is
19The ECB, in its role in the single supervisory mechanism, seems to be cognizant of this
poential issue. Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, stated during his opening speech at the
European Banking Congress “The key to an effective resolution regime is that it creates legal
certainty, consistency and predictability, thus helping to avoid ad-hoc solutions”.
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one method that has been applied for contingent capital (Glasserman and Nouri,
2012). However, a range of market based measures linking the trigger to equity
levels in addition to yields on long-term debt may be appropriate in the case of
bail-in (Sundaresan and Wang, 2013). This would allow debt investors to explicitly
determine the risk of bail-in from market related borrow costs. It is important
to note that the establishment of a bail-in framework for failed banks does not
preclude the introduction of contingent convertible instruments as a means of
bank funding. In fact, our analysis suggests that the introduction of an extra layer
of hybrid capital would act as a buffer for senior claims, altering the impact of a
bail-in framework on higher ranked securities. Finally, a pre-insolvency resolution
trigger would allow for a prompt and effective reaction to bank distress, potentially
reducing the overall cost to investors and society, (Zhou et al., 2012). There are,
however, also dangers associated with a pre-insolvency trigger, with potential for
unnecessary bail-in.
Introduction of a European bail-in mechanism may alter the intrinsic funding
costs faced by European banks. A survey by investment bank J.P. Morgan sug-
gested that the introduction of bail-in would result in an expected increase of 87
basis points in the long-term debt yield for a single A rated bank, with an estimated
3− 4 notch downgrade on Moody’s rating scale.20 The European Commission has
estimated an overall increase in bank funding costs including short-term debt of
31.6 basis points, (The European Commission, 2012b). The Commission has fur-
ther calculated that the combined cost of increasing capital requirements to meet
the 10.5% Basel III minimum and simultaneously introducing bail-in would range
between 0.5% and 1.2% of GDP per annum. In contrast, European GDP dropped
by 4.4% during 2009, while experiencing total growth of 1.5% between 2007 and
20J.P. Morgan survey of 55 European Banks, The Great Bank Downgrade January 2011.
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2012.21 This suggests the balance between the costs of financial stability and the
potential cost of prudence should be carefully considered.
21Source: Eurostat, Euro Area real GDP growth rate (17 countries).
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Number of Banks 2007 Impairment Charges 2008-2012 (em)
Country Capital Nationalized Surviving Capital Nationalized Surviving
Austria 2 2 20 13,952 3,959 2,679
Belgium 3 0 6 32,600 0 205
Germany 6 1 516 89,115 8,359 27,734
Denmark 1 2 19 10,804 0 3,845
Spain 0 1 28 0 0 141,125
Finland 0 0 4 0 0 87
France* 35 0 13 0 56,800 8,340
Great Britain 3 4 27 130,141 4,313 117,876
Greece 7 0 2 33,967 0 715
Ireland 2 4 0 45,844 42,247 0
Italy 2 0 40 34,432 0 73,757
Netherlands 4 1 1 22,997 0 11,505
Portugal 1 0 6 0 5,245 7,049
Sweden 0 0 9 0 0 10,719
Total 66 15 691 413,852 120,923 405,636
Grand Total 772 940,411
Table 1: Breakdown of bank status and total impairment charges (2008-2012)
European bank failures between 2008 and 2009 are shown, broken out by country according to ‘Capital’ -
government capital injection required, ‘Nationalized’ - bank nationalized and ‘Surviving’ - survived without
government assistance. Total realized impairment charges are calculated for each bank as the sum of loan
writedowns and non-recurring expenses between 2008 and 2012. All data is sourced from Bankscope and given
in millions of Euro. *Note: The French bank Credit Agricole is treated as a collection of separate cooperative
institutions in this study due to missing aggregate data for the combined entity.
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2006 2007
Liability Type Capital Nat. Sur. All Capital Nat. Sur. All
Total Customer Deposits 32.1% 27.7% 38.6% 35.2% 31.2% 20.5% 36.7% 33.5%
Deposits from Banks 19.4% 14.9% 12.3% 15.7% 17.8% 21.5% 10.6% 14.4%
Total Long Term Debt 16.3% 40.8% 19.9% 18.9% 15.1% 36.3% 17.8% 17.3%
Senior Debt 13.9% 39.3% 16.0% 15.8% 12.3% 34.5% 15.0% 14.5%
Subordinated Debt 1.6% 1.5% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.7% 1.5% 1.6%
Other Funding 1.9% 0.0% 3.4% 2.6% 1.1% 0.1% 1.3% 1.1%
Other Liabilities 27.9% 13.1% 24.2% 25.5% 31.4% 16.8% 29.4% 29.8%
Total Liabilities 95.8% 97.1% 95.0% 95.5% 96.0% 96.2% 95.1% 95.5%
Total Equity 4.2% 2.9% 5.0% 4.5% 4.0% 3.8% 4.9% 4.5%
Table 2: Aggregate Balance Sheet Liabilities for European Union Banks 2006-2007
An aggregate European Union bank balance sheet is determined by summing over all liabilities. Proportions
are then found as a percentage of total balance sheeet liabilities for each of 2006 and 2007. Banks are
categorized as ‘Capital’ - government re-capitalization required, ‘Nat.’ - nationalized, ‘Sur.’ - Survived
without government assistance and ‘All’ - All banks. Other liabilities include derivatives, non-interest, repos
and trading liabilities.
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Total Subordinated Senior Total
Country Status Number Equity Debt Debt Liabilities & Equity
Austria Cap. 2 100.0% 5.7% 0.0% 5.6%
Nat. 2 100.0% 100.0% 11.2% 12.8%
Belgium Cap. 3 63.2% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1%
Germany Cap. 6 100.0% 100.0% 2.7% 5.1%
Nat. 1 100.0% 100.0% 3.2% 5.2%
Denmark Cap. 1 84.6% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0%
Nat.* 2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Spain Nat.* 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
France Cap.** 35 39.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9%
Great Britain Cap. 3 100.0% 75.5% 0.0% 5.6%
Nat. 4 85.4% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0%
Greece Cap. 7 100.0% 100.0% 77.8% 20.8%
Ireland Cap. 2 100.0% 100.0% 24.6% 13.4%
Nat. 4 100.0% 100.0% 64.5% 23.3%
Italy Cap. 2 57.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.6%
Netherlands Cap. 4 52.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8%
Nat.* 1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Portugal Cap. 1 100.0% 49.9% 0.0% 5.5%
Europe All Nat. 15 100.0% 100.0% 6.9% 7.1%
Cap. 66 97.1% 0.0% 0.0% 4.0%
Table 3: Proportion of liabilities required for bail-in to cover writedown losses by country.
This table measures the level of ‘bail-in’ that would have been required by EU banks in order to cover losses
from the global financial crisis. Total realized impairment charges are calculated for each bank as the sum
of loan writedowns and non-recurring expenses between 2008 and 2012. The proportion of each balance
sheet liability required to be written down to cover these losses is then calculated. * In both Spain and
Denmark nationalized banks were incorporated into a ‘bad-bank’ resulting in no impairment charges detailed
in accounts. ** The French bank Credit Agricole is treated as a collection of separate cooperative institutions
in this study due to missing aggregate data for the combined entity.
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Status Writedown Total Equity Subordinated Debt Senior Debt
Actual Realized Impairments
Nationalized 7.1% 100% 100% 6.9%
Capital 4.0% 97% 0% 0.0%
Surviving 3.37% 64% 0% 0.0%
Stress Test - Losses = 10% of Aggregate Bank Assets
Nationalized 10% 100% 100% 13.4%
Capital 10% 100% 100% 27.5%
Surviving 10% 100% 100% 18%
Stress Test - Losses = 20% of Aggregate Bank Assets
Nationalized 20% 100% 100% 37.9%
Capital 20% 100% 100% 96.3%
Surviving 20% 100% 100% 77%
Table 4: Stress test analysis: Bail-in losses under extreme adverse conditions.
This table stress tests the level of ‘bail-in’ that would have been required by EU banks in order to cover losses
from the global financial crisis. Total realized impairment charges are calculated for each bank as the sum of
loan write-downs and non-recurring expenses between 2008 and 2012. In addition, losses of 10% and 20% of
aggregate assets are examined. The proportion of each balance sheet liability required to be written down to
cover these losses is then calculated.
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